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Introduction
The history of the transmission, recovery and posthumous influence of ancient scepticism is a fascinating chapter in the history of ideas. An extraordinary collection of philosophical texts and some of the most challenging arguments ever devised were first lost, then only partly recovered philologically, and finally rediscovered conceptually, leaving Cicero and Sextus Empiricus as the main champions of Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism respectively. This chapter outlines what we know about this shipwreck and what was later savaged from it. It cannot provide many details, given its length. And, being a review, it does not try to solve the many puzzles and mysteries still unsolved. But, as an introduction, it does seek to give a general idea of what happened to ancient scepticism in the long span of time occurring between Augustin and Descartes. It is a dozen of centuries of Western philosophy, so a few generalizations, some schematism and a good degree of abstraction from specific information will be inevitable. The reader interested in pursuing further knowledge about the topic is invited to consult Schmitt [1972a] , Floridi [2002] and Popkin [2003] .
Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages
Our story begins with a dramatic loss of memory, roughly in the fourth century. By the time Augustine was writing Contra Academicos, Academic scepticism, transmitted in Latin, had become the brand of scepticism known to philosophers and theologians, at the expense of Pyrrhonism in general and Sextus Empiricus' Greek texts in particular. There may still be some sporadic references to the Pyrrhonians at the beginning of the fifth century, 1 but it is indicative that the word academicus had become synonymous with sceptic, a linguistic use that will remain unchanged until the seventeenth century. Although scepticus occurs in Aulus Gellius, the technical word and its cognate terms will become common currency only in the 1430s, 2 after the spread of Traversari's translation of Diogenes Laertius. 3 This will undergo twelve editions before the end of the sixteenth century, and will be very influential in establishing the conceptual, Latin vocabulary used by philosophers in the following centuries. The sceptical terminology and arsenal of arguments will be initially based on Cicero's and Augustine's Latin works. Pyrrhonism will reach the philosophical debate only in the sixteenth and seventeenth century through the Latinized technical lexicon of Academic scepticism. 4 In the early Middle Ages, there appears to have been no epistemological defence of scepticism as such, nor further attempts at confutation after Augustine's. If Christian religion was able to awaken the saint from his sceptical nightmare, its robust sense of realism also succeeded in preventing medieval philosophers from entertaining logically possible questions on the nature of human knowledge, and hence systematic sceptical doubts about its reliability. Or at least so it seemed for a long time. In De Anima, Tertullian (160-240) had already clarified the Christian attitude towards knowledge in rather drastic tones: a Christian does not need to acquire much knowledge, firstly because facts that are positively certain are few, and secondly because endless investigations are forbidden by Paul of Tarsus. Curiosity is a vice and it is better to leave the fruits on the tree of knowledge untouched. Man is not allowed to discover more than he learns from God; and what he learns from God constitutes all he needs to know. 5 Superficially, such a hyper-realistic position could be considered akin to that of the sceptical philosopher, whose ataraxia was compatible with a state of ignorance. However, the comparison would be misleading, if taken seriously. The Christian thinker was not interested in denying the full intelligibility of reality to the human mind, but keen on ranking the pursuit of mundane knowledge much lower than the love and worship of God. The logical arguments intended to humble human reason may be similar because the target of the polemic is the same, namely human knowledge and its intellectual pretensions. Indeed, Tertullian borrowed some of his dialectical weapons from Aenesidemus, through the work of the physician and doxographer Soranus (98-138), who, in his turn, had probably read Aenesidemus' own work, which was still available during the early Middle Ages. Nevertheless, the difference between ancient scepticism and Christian anti-intellectualism remains substantial, for it consisted in what was at stake: anti-dogmatism, tolerance and mundane ataraxia in the former case, belief, dogmatism and eternal salvation in the latter.
Once systematic doubt has been instilled, ancient scepticism seeks to step back into suspension of judgment, whereas Christianized anti-intellectualism leaps forward into faith.
Together with the linguistic issue⎯even educated people no longer spoke or understood Greek and medieval Latin had now moved far from its classic sources⎯religious "dogmatism" (both in the Greek and in the ordinary sense of the word), theological interests and the neglect of epistemological investigations contribute to explain why, in the eight centuries between Augustine and John of Salisbury, whose interest in sceptical issues also depends on Cicero, scant information about ancient scepticism was available, transmitted and hence discussed. This does not mean that we should see the Middle Ages as "the Age of Faith", incapable of entertaining sceptical doubts because dogmatic, gullible, irrational or merely acritical. As stressed by Reynolds [1991] , in those eight centuries we encounter, for example, a large variety of forms of unbelief, in many cultural contexts. The point is that the Middle Ages show no driving interest in sceptical arguments within the restricted philosophical and theological debates that may address issues concerning the nature and reliability of knowledge, when discussing ethical, religious and epistemological questions at "a scientific level", as we would say nowadays. Again, a methodological point seems in need of clarification here. Equating unbelief and scepticism, either during the Middle Ages or in the following epochs, without any further proviso, simply means muddling the history of scepticism and misinterpreting its importance. Scepticism has its own varieties but, on the whole it is a technical and fairly distinct family of philosophical positions, not just a way of being a bit doubtful or questioning about the world. If anyone who raises a doubt, questions a religious assumption or adopts a critical stance is to be called a sceptic, the very label ends up by covering too much and loses its meaning. "What does it take to avoid being a sceptic?" If the answer is "being absolutely dogmatic" then the reader knows that the label is misused, because every decent philosopher would probably qualify as being a bit of a sceptic.
Returning to our reconstruction, there may have been controversies over issues that may have a sceptical flavour for us, like the polemic contraposition of the patio of the Academy, representing the subtleties of Greek philosophy, and the temple of Solomon, 5 Tertullian [1947], 4 and 97. representing the plain doctrine of Judaeo-Christian religion, which was common currency among Christian writers from Tertullian to Savonarola; or the interpretation of the book of Ecclesiastes, for a long time considered to be Solomon's work, 6 and the topos of contemptus mundi; or again the anti-intellectualist theses evident in the writings of Paul of Tarsus 7 and rooted in the Greek Apologists. But it should be noted that similar topics bore only a negative relation to the epistemological and ethical problems originally raised by ancient scepticism.
They stressed the weakness of human knowledge in order to redirect the interest of the audience towards Christian faith, and hence to foster behaviour consistent with it. The emphasis was not on the nature of knowledge, but on the attitude to be taken with respect to revelation, Christ's teachings and the Old Testament. Witness the fact that, in this long interval, sources of information about ancient scepticism were largely forgotten rather than ostracized or exploited. Texts in the Christian tradition 8 either contained too few indications about sceptical topics or, insofar as they did, they were largely disregarded. Important examples included:
• the Stromata 9 of Clement of Alexandria (150-211/215);
• Marcus Minucius Felix's Octavius (written sometime between 197 and 248). The
Octavius, whose structure is modelled on Cicero's De natura deorum, contains an interesting, if brief, discussion between Caecilius (the pagan) and Octavius (the Christian) on the sceptical way of life. The work disappeared from view for Western scholars from the fifth until the sixteenth century and it is revealing that it was preserved as the last book of Arnobius' Adversus Nationes, another sceptical source (see below in this list).
The Octavius seems to be among the first texts in which there starts to be confusion between Academics and Pyrrhonians; • Tertullian's De Anima, and his Apologeticum, a work strictly connected with the
Octavius;
6 See Bultot [1980] ; Lazzari [1965] , and Hattaway [1968] . 7 For a discussion of the theme of Pauline fideism in relation to Stephanus' interest in Sextus, see Floridi [1992] . For a moderately anti-intellectualist interpretation of Paul of Tarsus' Letters to the Corinthians, see Stowers [1990] . 8 Relevant passages from early Christian writers concerning Greek philosophy have been selected and translated into German by Albert Warkotsch in Warkotsch [1973] . The reader may wish to consult this convenient collection for further bibliographical details. The history of the reception of sceptical themes in Christian theology has been a rather neglected topic, and certainly deserves more attention, especially considering the influence that the early Fathers of the Church had on the post-medieval discussion of sceptical themes. 9 On Clement of Alexandria's relation to Pyrrhonism, see Sepp [1893] , 59-60.
• Hippolytus' Refutatio Omnium Haeresium;
• the Praeparatio Evangelica of Eusebius (ca. 256-339); this influential book contains several references to Pyrrhonian themes, but the second council of Nicaea (787) prohibited quoting Eusebius as a reliable source of correct belief because of his sympathetic position with respect to Arian doctrines; • Arnobius' Adversus Nationes, written at the end of the third or at the beginning of the fourth century. Note that Arnobius had great influence on Huet and was well known to Bayle; 10 • the Divinae Institutiones of Lactantius, who was Arnobius' pupil; and finally Other classical sources soon disappeared from the bookshelves of the medieval theologians.
Examples include:
• Cicero, including his De Natura Deorum;
• the Adversus Colotem of Plutarch (between 50 and 120), which provides a wealth of information on the sceptical school; 11
• the Vitarum Auctio and the Hermotimus by Lucian (b. 120). 12 Lucian's works disappeared from Western culture during the Middle Ages. As was often the case, Byzantine writers had more continuous access to them (more on this later);
• De optimo docendi genere by Galen, a work in which the latter expounds the views of Academics and Pyrrhonians in the course of refuting them. Stephanus thought it worthwhile to publish it in Latin translation (the translation was by Erasmus), together with Diogenes Laertius' Life of Pyrrho, in his first Latin, printed edition of PH in 1562; 13 • Aulus Gellius' Attic Nights, written in the latter half of the second century. Both Lactantius and Augustine knew the work. Later, it was even palimpsested and disappeared until the ninth century. Aulus Gellius provides a synthetic but valuable analysis of the similarities and differences between Pyrrhonians and Academics, which, though philosophically questionable, indicates that he still perceived the two sceptical At the end of the seventh century, Bede (672 or 673 -735), certainly one of the greatest scholars of his time, provides an almost sympathetic reference to the Academics and the Pyrrhonians. In a passage from a sort of philosophical lexicon attributed to him, 14 which discusses passages from Aristotle and other philosophers and is organised alphabetically, under the letter D, we can read an entry on the value of the process of Dubitare. Bede suggests that a questioning attitude, not universal and unqualified, as is the case with the Academics and the Pyrrhonians, who mistakenly doubt everything (and here there is a reference to Aulus Gellius), but focused on specific cases, may turn out to be far from useless.
In the ninth century, we encounter some scattered and ill-informed remarks on the Pyrrhonians and the Academics in Rabanus Maurus. He compares the Academics to heretics, a deceptive interpretation not uncommon since the early Greek fathers, which had the most adverse effect possible on the transmission of the sceptical texts. A longer and more detailed description of the sceptical sect is provided by Photios in his Bibliotheca. 15 A comparison between the two writers is revealing.
On the Latin side of Europe, when the Middle Ages gave rise to an encyclopaedic interest, Western scholars had to rely on secondary sources for their scarce information on the sceptical thinkers. Ignoring Greek, they had access only to texts transmitted in Latin, and hence almost exclusively concerning the Academic tradition, Tertullian being among the most important exceptions. In our case, Rabanus Maurus' sporadic observations were based on two sources. One was Jerome (340 ca. -420 ca.), who in turn was hinting at a fundamental question, vigorously debated during the fourth century, between Eunomius on one side and Basil and Gregory of Nyssa on the other, namely whether it is possible to have some knowledge of God (see Meredith [1975] prompted radical forms of criticism of human cognition, and hence paved the way to forms of sceptical doubt. A century after John of Salisbury, Henry of Ghent, following Augustine, discussed and criticized issues that have a sceptical tone for us. 23 And as in Augustine, "the refutation of these arguments rested upon the acceptance of a Platonic conception of human knowledge which granted to the Skeptics at least part of their own arguments" (Gilson [1955] , 447). Obviously, the major source of information was still the Latin and Academic tradition.
In the fourteenth century, there begins to develop an initial form of what one may consider nowadays a truly sceptical concern from an epistemological perspective. It is a graft from the sceptical tree probably unaware of its Greek roots 24 and, for want of any substantial evidence so far, with no direct bearing on the sceptical debate that will flourish in the seventeenth century. The late medieval debate on proto-sceptical issues was connected rather with epistemological investigations resulting from factors such as a critical approach to
Aristotle's texts, the spread of logical studies and hence the parallel debate upon the paradoxes and insolubilia, the coming to maturity of the controversy upon the nature of universals, and the discussion concerning the implications of the doctrine of the total contingency of the world. Ockhamism, for example, by developing to its final consequences the presupposition of God's boundless omnipotence, could raise doubts about the nature of reality and the power of reason that would find a conceptual echo in Descartes' Meditations.
If God was really omnipotent, nothing was necessarily as it was; everything could have been otherwise. The possibility that things may in fact differ completely from the way they appear could be seriously and consistently entertained. 25 Greek grammar published posthumously by his nephew in 1588 we find him using Sextus' writings as one of his linguistic sources, a procedure that was followed in the same period by
Stephanus, who exploited Sextus' Adversus Grammaticos for his edition of the Thesaurus Regarding the use of Sextus Empiricus as an historical source of information, it remains to be noted that this paved the way to a debate on the objective nature of historical knowledge in the middle of the sixteenth century. 32 Depending on the level of reading, Sextus' works could be considered a useful source of information about past philosophies or a critical warning against the ultimate unreliability of any claim to truth. Francesco Robortello (1516 Robortello ( -1567 , for example, defended the possibility of writing history against Sextus' arguments, in his De historica facultate disputatio (Robortello [1548] ).
The recovery and diffusion of Sextus' texts, although caused by literary, erudite, antiquarian and philological interests, soon led to, and became intertwined with the philosophical study of the sceptical doctrines, and gained further momentum from this theoretical interest. It was initially a matter of ethical and religious interpretations, also related to linguistic issues such as the interpretation of the Bible, the discussion of exegetical techniques, and the debate on free will and predestination. Scepticism's real essence is the defence of a constantly open, finely balanced, critical stance towards any dogmatic (in the common sense of the word) position. It is not an easy attitude, and the sceptic is usually a negative hero, a Samson who dies with all the Philistines when he makes the temple of certainties collapse. The discomfort of intelligence when confronted by a complex, multifarious, ever-changing world, elusive and scarcely intelligible because radically "other", is counterbalanced by the awareness of one's own moral detachment, intellectual integrity and hence superiority with respect to the Dogmatist (the believer), whom the sceptic considers to be philosophically naive. However, individual tolerance goes hand in hand with a lack of interest in the world and its destiny. Scepticism is an individualistic philosophy, which needs some subjective responsibility and "social space"-the possibility of living a private life without necessarily interacting publicly with other people-to develop its nondogmatic tranquillity. Once the devastating critique of human reason began to spread, scepticism became, as we have seen, a two-edged sword. It could be used to challenge any ultimate, fixed system of universal truths, including religious ones, thus opening the way for agnosticism, freethinking and libertinism, as the Emperor Julian had already suspected, or it could be used to undermine confidence in any claim to knowledge in favour of faith and The epistemological debate on sceptical doubts, on the nature of empirical knowledge and on scientific certainty would develop primarily at the beginning of the seventeenth century, once Sextus' writings and the recovery of scepticism had deeply affected French philosophy (Van Leeuwen [1963] ). Jacopo Sadoleto (1477 Sadoleto ( -1547 Stephanus' translation of PH (Villey [1933] ), which we need to remember also contained a translation of Laertius' Life of Pyrrho and of Galen's De optimo docendi genere. 34 Besides,
Montaigne also owned copies of Guy de Brués' Dialogues (Brues [1953] ) and of Agrippa's 33 On Gianfrancesco Pico' interest in scepticism, see Cao [1994] . 34 Montaigne probably studied the 1562 edition, since there are no references to M in his writings, cf. Villey [1933] , 242-3 and 290.
De Incertitudine et Vanitate Scientiarum (Agrippa [1974] ).
Montaigne probably never went back to Sextus' Outlines. Villey [1933] (Brush [1966] ; see also Schiffman [1984] ). Yet this interpretation looks at
Montaigne from a Cartesian perspective and may be slightly anachronistic, for it does not take into account the fundamental fact that, until that time, the feeble tradition of philosophical interpretations of the sceptical literature had been mainly one of ethical and religious readings. Montaigne was in line with his time. What should rather be said is that, in Montaigne, logical and epistemological themes already start to emerge, although they are still framed within a consistently pragmatic and religious picture. The fact that Montaigne reduced the case against reasoning or logic almost completely to Aenesidemus' tropi of the diversity of opinion and the unreliability of the senses is in keeping with the culture of the time. The fact that he also discussed the problem of the criterion (diallelus) at length is a step forward into the purely epistemological debate to come. Interpreted on the basis of his quotations, Montaigne is a humanist; but it is sufficient to read one of the last sentences of the Apology-"We do not have any communication with Being"-to understand his position 35 See Gray [1977] .
as the last of the great Renaissance philosophers. No scholastic or humanist philosopher could have felt such extraneousness. Modern philosophy was going to be based on such a feeling of being a foreigner to the world.
Conclusion
If during the fifteenth and sixteenth century the epistemological debate on scepticism, as we understand it now, was largely confined to the background, this was mainly because humanistic culture was not the right context within which such a radical attack on knowledge could flourish. As far as the principal interests of the humanists were concerned-i.e. literary and linguistic studies, Christian ethics and the recovery of the past-sceptical works attracted limited but not insignificant attention. A scholarly culture like that of the humanists, interested in the history of thought and texts and still far from any idea of, let alone a faith in, the endless progress of scientific knowledge, was not likely to be deeply and seriously affected by sceptical arguments at the epistemological level, as Descartes would be.
The correct way to understand the history of scepticism from Francesco Filelfo to
Henricus Stephanus is to focus on the role played by humanists in recovering the knowledge of Sextus, rather than on the limited philosophical use of such writings in those years. In order to regain a dramatic role in the philosophical tradition, the contents of the Outlines and of Adversus Mathematicos had to wait until the epistemological developments at the end of the Renaissance, when Sextus began to gain some relevance in the discussion of astrological and historiographical topics. But it was only when philosophers were confronted by a vastly increased amount of scientific knowledge that they presented a fully epistemological interpretation of the cognitive enterprise. Only then did the sceptical attitude gain all its destructive power, acquiring those specifically epistemological features that we still attribute to it nowadays. After Montaigne, Pyrrhonism (rather than Academic scepticism) was less and less often interpreted as a way of life and an ethical philosophy, coming to play the role of a dialectical pole in the epistemological inquiry that would be fully exploited by Descartes.
In 1621, the first edition of the Greek text of both PH and M was finally published.
Sextus' writings had become a classic, which no serious library could afford to lack. Exactly twenty years after the publication of Sextus in Greek, in 1641, there appeared in Paris the first edition of Descartes' Meditations. Descartes wrote that he had read some Scholastic authors and found them exceedingly boring. He had then dipped into some sceptical treatises (Descartes [1972] , IX, 103) and discovered in them a remarkably interesting procedure. In arguments as if they were puzzles to solve, tricks to be unmasked, or traps to be avoided. It is possible that Descartes never read Sextus' work, but this is less crucial than it may seem because, by the time the Meditations were published, we should no longer speak of the influence of sceptical arguments on modern philosophy, but rather take them to be an integral part of it.
